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Abstract
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in many economics elds. In this
paper, we construct a simple labor model to show that a social choice function
which can be implemented costly in Bayesian Nash equilibrium may not be truth-
fully implementable. The key point is the strategy cost property given in Section
4: In the direct mechanism, each agent only reports a type and will not pay the
strategy cost which would be paid by himself when playing strategies in the original
indirect mechanism. As a result, the revelation principle may not hold when agents'
strategies are costly in the indirect mechanism.
JEL codes: D71, D82
Key words: Revelation principle; Game theory; Mechanism design; Auction
theory.
1 Introduction
The revelation principle plays an important role in microeconomics theory and
has been applied to many other elds such as auction theory, mechanism design
etc. According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green (Page 884, Line 24 [1]): \The implication of the revelation principle is ...
to identify the set of implementable social choice functions in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, we need only identify those that are truthfully implementable."
Related denitions about the revelation principle can be seen in Appendix,
which are cited from Section 23.B and 23.D of MWG's textbook[1].
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Generally speaking, some costs are required for a social choice function to be
implemented by a mechanism. There are two dierent kinds of costs possi-
bly occurred in a mechanism: 1) strategy costs, which are possibly occurred
when agents play strategies; and 2) misreporting costs, which are possibly
occurred when agents report types falsely. 1 In the traditional literature of
mechanism design, costs are usually referred to the former. Recently, some
researchers began to investigate misreporting costs. For every type  and ev-
ery type ^ an agent might misreport, Kephart and Conitzer [2] dened a cost
function as c(; ^) for doing so. Traditional mechanism design is just the case
where c(; ^) = 0 everywhere, and partial verication is a special case where
c(; ^) 2 f0;1g [3{5]. Kephart and Conitzer [2] proposed that when reporting
truthfully is costless and misreporting can be costly, the revelation principle
can fail to hold.
Despite these accomplishments, so far people seldom consider the two dier-
ent kinds of costs simultaneously. The aim of this paper is to investigate the
justication of revelation principle when both of two kinds of costs are con-
sidered. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct a labor
model, then dene a social choice function f and an indirect mechanism, in
which agents' strategies are costly. In Section 3, we prove f can be implement-
ed by the indirect mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we
propose a strategy cost property and point out that the revelation principle
may not hold even if misreporting costs are zero and only strategy costs oc-
cur. In Section 5, we prove that f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, which contradicts the revelation principle. Finally, Section
6 draws conclusions.
2 A labor model
Here we construct a labor model which uses some ideas from the rst-price
sealed auction model in Example 23.B.5 [1] and the signaling model [1,6].
There are one rm and two workers. Worker 1 and Worker 2 dier in the
number of units of output they produce if hired by the rm, which is denoted
by productivity type. The rm wants to hire a worker with productivity as
high as possible, and the two workers compete for this job oer.
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
1) The possible productivity types of two workers are: L and H , where
H > L > 0. Each worker i's productivity type i (i = 1; 2) is his private
information.
2) There is a certication that the rm can announce as a hire criterion. The
1 It is usually assumed that each agent can report his true type with zero cost.
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education level corresponding to the certication is eH > 0. Each worker de-
cides by himself whether to get the certication or not, hence the possible
education levels are eH and 0. Each worker i's education level ei (i = 1; 2) is
observable to the rm. Education does nothing for a worker's productivity.
3) The strategy cost of obtaining education ei for a worker i (i = 1; 2) of pro-
ductivity type i is given by a function c(ei; i) = ei=i. That is, the strategy
cost is lower for a high-productivity worker.
4) The misreporting cost for a low-productivity worker to report the high
productivity type H is a xed value c
0 > 0. In addition, a high-productivity
worker is assumed to report the low productivity type L with zero cost.
The labor model's outcome is represented by a vector (y1; y2), where yi denotes
the probability that worker i gets the job oer with wage w > 0 which is
chosen by the rm. Recall that the rm does not know the exact productivity
types of two workers, but its aim is to hire a worker with productivity as
high as possible. This aim can be represented by a social choice function
f() = (y1(); y2()), in which  = (1; 2),
y1() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 > 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 < 2
; y2() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 < 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 > 2
(1)
In order to implement the above f(), the rm designs an indirect mechanism
  = (S1; S2; g) as follows: For each worker i = 1; 2, conditional on his type
i 2 fL; Hg, he chooses the education level as a bid bi : fL; Hg ! f0; eHg.
The strategy set Si is the set of all possible bids, and the outcome function g
is dened as:
g(b1; b2) = (p1; p2) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if b1 > b2
(0:5; 0:5); if b1 = b2
(0; 1); if b1 < b2
(2)
where pi (i = 1; 2) is the probability that worker i gets the job oer.
Let u0 be the utility of the rm, and u1; u2 be the utilities of worker 1; 2 in
the indirect mechanism   respectively, then u0(b1; b2) = p11 + p22   w, and
for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
ui(bi; bj; i) =
8>><>>:
w   bi=i; if bi > bj
0:5w   bi=i; if bi = bj
 bi=i; if bi < bj
(3)
The item \bi=i" occurred in Eq (3) is just the strategy cost paid by agent
i of type i when he performs the strategy bi(i) in the indirect mechanism.
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Suppose the conservative utilities of worker 1 and worker 2 are both zero, then
the individual rationality (IR) constraints are: ui(bi; bj; i)  0, i = 1; 2.
3 f is Bayesian implementable
Proposition 1: If w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), the social choice function f() given
in Eq (1) can be implemented by the indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a separating strategy, i:e:, workers with dierent productivity
types choose dierent education levels,
b1(1) =
8<:eH ; if 1 = H0; if 1 = L ; b2(2) =
8<:eH ; if 2 = H0; if 2 = L : (4)
Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Assume bj(j) takes this form, i:e:,
bj(j) =
8<:eH ; if j = H0; if j = L ; (5)
then we consider worker i's problem (i 6= j). For each i 2 fL; Hg, worker
i solves a maximization problem: maxbi h(bi; i), where by Eq (3) the object
function is
h(bi; i) = (w bi=i)P (bi > bj(j))+(0:5w bi=i)P (bi = bj(j)) (bi=i)P (bi < bj(j))
(6)
We discuss this maximization problem in four dierent cases:
1) Suppose i = j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = 0)  (bi=L)P (bi < 0)
=
8<:w   eH=L; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
2) Suppose i = L, j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = eH)  (bi=L)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=L; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0 :
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Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
3) Suppose i = H , j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = 0)  (bi=H)P (bi < 0)
=
8<:w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
4) Suppose i = j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = eH)  (bi=H)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
From the above four cases, it can be seen that if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L),
the strategy bi (i) of worker i
bi (i) =
8<:eH ; if i = H0; if i = L (7)
is the optimal response to the strategy bj(j) of worker j (j 6= i) given in Eq (5).
Therefore, the strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by  .
Now let us investigate whether the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) satises the
individual rationality (IR) constraints. Following Eq (3) and Eq (7), the (IR)
constraints are changed into: 0:5w bH=H > 0. Obviously, w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L)
satises the (IR) constraints.
In summary, if w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), then by Eq(2) and Eq(7), for any
 = (1; 2), where 1; 2 2 fL; Hg, there holds:
g(b1(1); b

2(2)) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
; (8)
which is just the social choice function f() given in Eq (1). 2
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4 Strategy cost property
Before discussing the truthful implementation problem of a costly Bayesian
implementable social choice function, we rst cite the basic idea behind the
revelation principle given in MWG's textbook (Page 884, Line 16, [1]): \If in
mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), each agent nds that, when his type is i,
choosing si (i) is his best response to the other agents' strategies, then if we
introduce mediator who says `Tell me your type, i, and I will play s

i (i) for
you', each agent will nd truth telling to be an optimal strategy given that
all other agents tell the truth. That is, truth telling will be a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of this direct revelation game".
Although this basic idea looks reasonable, we propose that behind the me-
diator's announcement \Tell me your type, i, I will play s

i (i) for you", an
assumption should be added to make this announcement credible: after receiv-
ing each agent i's report i (i = 1;    ; I), in order to be able to play si (i) for
agent i, the mediator should also pay the strategy cost which would be paid
by agent i himself when carrying out si (i) in the original mechanism.
Generally speaking, the strategy costs can be thought of as nancial costs or
eorts paid by agents when carrying out their strategies. According to MWG's
textbook (Page 883, Line 7 [1]), agents' strategies are either possible actions
or plans of actions. No matter which format the agents' strategies might be,
if the strategy costs occurred in the original mechanism cannot be ignored,
then only when such assumption holds will the mediator's announcement be
credible to the agents. Otherwise none of agents is willing to attend the direct
mechanism, which means the direct mechanism cannot start up.
However, the so-called \mediator" is a virtual role which does not exist at all.
It is unreasonable to assume that the nonexistent\mediator" pay the strategy
costs for agents. Hence, the above explanation of the revelation principle using
the virtual \mediator" is wrong when agents' strategies are costly. According
to Denition 23.B.5 (See Appendix), the only legal action for each agent i in
the direct mechanism is just to report a type i (which means that s

i (i) is
illegal for agent i), and the outcome function is just the social choice function.
From the perspective of agents, the above-mentioned result is formalized as
the following strategy cost property:
Strategy cost property: In the direct mechanism, each agent only reports
a type and will not pay the strategy cost which would be paid by himself when
playing strategies in the original indirect mechanism.
The strategy cost property can be understood by proof of contradiction. Re-
consider the example in Section 2. Suppose there are two dierent kinds of
certications from which the rm can choose one as a hire criterion, and the
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education levels corresponding to the two certications are dierent: e0H and
e00H . Hence, after the rm announces a certication, by Eq (3) and Eq (7)
each agent in the indirect mechanism will know which kind of strategy cost
he should pay in Bayesian equilibrium: e0H=H or e
00
H=H . Now assume that
each agent will still pay the strategy cost in the direct mechanism. Then after
each agent reports a type to the rm, the rm performs the outcome function
which is just the social choice function f . Since there is no certication used
in the direct mechanism, it is impossible for each agent i to know which kind
of strategy cost he should pay: e0H=H or e
00
H=H . This is the contradiction.
Consequently, the strategy cost property holds.
One possible question to the strategy cost property is as follows:
Q1: The designer may dene the direct mechanism more generally. In partic-
ular, The designer denes a new mechanism in which each agent reports his
type, then the mechanism suggest to them which action to take, and the nal
outcome of the mechanism depends on both the report and the action (i.e.,
education level).
A1: This new mechanism is irrelevant to the direct mechanism. By Deni-
tion 23.B.5 (See Appendix), the nal outcome of the direct mechanism only
depends on agents' reports, and the designer must perform the outcome func-
tion after receiving agents' reports. It is illegal to assume that the designer
can send action advices to agents in the direct mechanism.
Besides the above question, another possible objection to the strategy cost
property is as follows: \Let us consider the equilibrium in the indirect mecha-
nism. Given the equilibrium, there is a mapping from vectors of agents' types
into outcomes. Now let us take that mapping to be a revelation game. It will
be the case that no type of any agent can make an announcement that diers
from his true type and do better".
It can be seen that this objection is equivalent to the proof of revelation prin-
ciple (see Appendix Proposition 23.D.1). Suppose the strategy costs cannot be
neglected in the indirect mechanism, let us make a detailed investigation on
the proof of Proposition 23.D.1. Given that an indirect mechanism   imple-
ments f costly in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, consider the equilibrium s() =
(s1();    ; sI()) in Eq (23.D.2), there is a mapping g(s()) : 1  I ! X
from a vector of agents' types  = (1;    ; I) into an outcome g(s()), which
is equal to the desired outcome f() for all  2 1      I . Note that in
Eq (23.D.2) and Eq (23.D.3), the indirect mechanism   works, and the utility
function ui of agent i (i = 1;    ; I) already reects the fact that each agent i
pays the strategy cost related to si (i) by himself.
Now let us take the mapping g(s()) to be a direct revelation game, in which
the strategy set of agent i is his type set, Si = i, and the designer carries out
the outcome function f(). In this revelation game, each agent i only reports a
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type and does not pay the strategy cost except for some possible misreporting
cost, thus the utility function of each agent i in the direct mechanism should
be changed from original ui to another function u
0
i, in which the item related
to strategy cost disappears. 2
As a result, given that an indirect mechanism implements f costly in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, in order to judge whether f is truthfully implementable in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium or not, we should use the new utility function u0i
instead of ui for each agent i. To be more precisely, the criterion to judge
whether f is truthfully implementable should be updated from Eq (23.D.1)
(See Appendix) to judge whether for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [u
0
i(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [u0i(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (9)
for all ^i 2 i, in which u0i is the utility function of agent i in the direct
mechanism, and is not equal to ui in the original indirect mechanism.
Therefore, the last sentence of the proof of Proposition 23.D.1 (See Appendix)
is wrong since Eq (23.D.4) is no longer the condition for f to be truthfully
implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium when strategies in the indirect
mechanism are costly. Furthermore, with the new utility function u0i, some
agent i may nd it benecial for him to dier from his true type i to another
false type ^i.
3 Put dierently, in the direct mechanism there may exists some
agent i 2 f1;    ; Ig, i; ^i 2 i such that
E i [u
0
i(f(i;  i); i)ji] < E i [u0i(f(^i;  i); i)ji];
which contradicts Eq (9).
To sum up, the strategy cost property is the cornerstone for the direct revela-
tion mechanism to start up. However, as we pointed out, it is the strategy cost
property itself that may change agents' utility functions in the direct mecha-
nism. Consequently, a costly Bayesian implementable social choice function
may not be truthfully implementable, which contradicts the revelation prin-
ciple. Note that in this section, only the strategy costs are considered and the
misreporting costs has nothing to do with the conclusion. Put dierently, the
revelation principle may not hold even if the misreporting costs are zero and
only the agents' strategies are costly. An example will be shown in Section 5.
2 In Section 5, the utility function of agent i in the direct mechanism is changed
from Eq (3) to Eq (10) and Eq (11), in which the item related to the strategy cost
\bi=i" disappears.
3 In Section 5, each worker i = 1; 2 nds it benecial to misreport ^i = H in the
direct mechanism under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), no matter what his true
type is.
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5 f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Proposition 2: If the misreporting cost c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the social choice func-
tion f() given in Eq (1) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the direct revelation mechanism  direct = (1;2; f()), in
which 1 = 2 = fL; Hg,  = (1; 2) 2 1 2. The timing steps of  direct
are as follows:
1) Each worker i (i = 1; 2) with true type i reports a type ^i 2 i to the
rm. Here ^i may not be equal to i.
2) The rm performs the outcome function f(^1; ^2), and hires the winner.
According to the strategy cost property, in the direct mechanism, each worker
i only reports a type and does not pay the strategy cost. The only possible
cost needed to pay is the misreporting cost c0 for a low-productivity worker to
report the high productivity type H . For worker i (i = 1; 2), if his true type
is i = L, his utility function will be as follows:
u0i(^i; ^j; i = L) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
w   c0; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w   c0; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (10)
If worker i's true type is i = H , his utility function will be as follows:
u0i(^i; ^j; i = H) =
8>><>>:
w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H); or(L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (11)
Note that the strategy cost item \bi=i" occurred in Eq (3) disappears in Eq
(10) and Eq (11). Following Eq (10) and Eq (11), we will discuss the utility
matrix of worker i and j in four cases. The rst and second entry in the
parenthesis denote the utility of worker i and j respectively.
1) Suppose the true types of worker i and j are i = H , j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for worker i and j is to truthfully
report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H . Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) =
(H ; H).
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2) Suppose the true types of worker i and j are i = L, j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w   c0; 0) (0:5w   c0; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for worker j is still to truthfully
report ^j = H ; and if the misreporting cost c
0 < 0:5w, the dominant strategy
for worker i is to misreport ^i = H , otherwise agent i would truthfully report.
Thus, under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
3) Suppose the true types of worker i and j are i = H , j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   c0)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w   c0)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for worker i is still to truthfully
report ^i = H ; and if the misreporting cost c
0 < 0:5w, the dominant strategy
for worker j is to misreport ^j = H , otherwise agent j would truthfully report.
Thus, under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
4) Suppose the true types of worker i and j are i = L, j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   c0)
H (w   c0; 0) (0:5w   c0; 0:5w   c0)
It can be seen that: if the misreporting cost c0 < 0:5w, the dominant strat-
egy for both worker i and worker j is to misreport, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H ,
otherwise both agents would truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of
c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
To sum up, under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by the direct mechanism is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and the
unique outcome of  direct is that each worker has the same probability 0.5
to get the job oer. Consequently, ^i = i (for all i 2 i, i = 1; 2) is not
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism under the
condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), and hence the social choice function f() is not
truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss the justication of revelation principle through a
simple labor model in which agents pay strategy costs during the process of an
indirect mechanism. The main characteristics of the labor model are as follows:
1) Agents' strategies are costly in the indirect mechanism, i.e., worker with
type H (or L) will pay the strategy cost eH=H (or eH=L) when obtaining
education level eH ; 2) The productivity type of worker is private information
and not observable to the rm; 3) Misreporting a higher type is also costly,
i.e., a low-productivity worker can pretend to be a high-productivity worker
with the misreporting cost c0.
The major dierence between this paper and traditional literature is just the
strategy cost property proposed in Section 4. By the strategy cost property,
when strategies in the indirect mechanism are costly, the utility function of
agents will be changed in the direct mechanism. Hence, the criterion to judge
whether f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium will also
be changed.
Section 3 and Section 5 give detailed analysis about the labor model:
1) In the indirect mechanism  , the utility function of each worker i = 1; 2 is
given by Eq (3), in which the strategy cost bi=i is the key item that makes
the separating strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L). Thus, the social choice function f can be
implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2) Following the strategy cost property, in the direct mechanism, the utility
function of each worker i is changed from Eq (3) to Eq (10) and Eq (11).
Under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game induced by the direct mechanism is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and ^

i = i
(for all i 2 i, i = 1; 2) is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct
mechanism. Thus, the social choice function f is not truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In summary, the revelation principle may not hold when agents' strategies are
costly in the indirect mechanism.
Appendix: Denitions in Section 23.B and 23.D [1]
Consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1;    ; I. Each agent i pri-
vately observes his type i that determines his preferences. The set of possible
types of agent i is denoted as i. The agent i's utility function over the out-
comes in set X given his type i is ui(x; i), where x 2 X.
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Denition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : 1  I !
X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types (1;    ; I), assigns a
collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1;    ; SI and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X.
Denition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which
Si = i for all i and g() = f() for all  2 1     I .
Denition 23.D.1: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]
for all s^i 2 Si.
Denition 23.D.2: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Denition 23.D.3: The social choice function f() is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if si (i) = i (for all i 2 i) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism   = (1;    ;I ; f()). That
is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)
for all ^i 2 i.
Proposition 23.D.1: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that im-
plements the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements f() in Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um, then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
g(s()) = f() for all , and for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.2)
for all s^i 2 Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(si (^i); s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.3)
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for all ^i 2 i. Since g(s()) = f() for all , (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23.D.4)
for all ^i 2 i. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1), the condition for f()
to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
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